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et al.: Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A Look at a Newly

COMMENTS
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS: A
LOOK AT A NEWLY EXTENDED DOCTRINE
[Gqc v. Dqyton-Hudon Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980)].
"The assimilation of the punitive damages remedy into the field of
products liability has just begun. This blending of distinct doctrines
with separate functions cannot be expected to occur without producing
a few rough edges. But time and experience will demonstrate that the
union is sound."
Owen, Punitive Damages In Product Li'abdity Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258,
1371 (1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of punitive damages.I Punitive damages, 2 which may be awarded in addition
1. See, e.g., E.H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 646 (D. Minn. 1979);
Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 99, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330-31 (1973); Johnson v.
Sleizer, 268 Minn. 421, 428, 129 N.W.2d 761, 765 (1964); Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn.
408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284-85 (1952); Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 494-95, 229
N.W. 869, 871 (1930); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173
(1925); Muenkel v. Muenkel, 143 Minn. 29, 33, 173 N.W. 184, 186 (1919); Anderson v.
International Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 51, 116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908);
Germolus v. Sausser, 83 Minn. 141, 144, 85 N.W. 946, 947 (1901); Crosby v. Humphreys,
59 Minn. 92, 96, 60 N.W. 843, 844 (1894); Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 308, 7 N.W.
263, 263 (1880); Seeman v. Feeney, 19 Minn. 79, 82, 19 Gil. 54, 55 (1872); Lynd v. Picket,
7 Minn. 184, 200-02, 7 Gil. 128, 142-44 (1862).
2. The terms "punitive damages" and "exemplary damages" are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96, 104 (D. Minn.
1967) ("punitive or exemplary damages"); Easton Farmers Elevator Co. v. Chromalloy
Am. Corp., 310 Minn. 568, 579, 246 N.W.2d 705, 712 (1976) (per curiam) ("exemplary

damages"); Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361, 364, 191 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1971) ("punitive" or "exemplary" damages); Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v.T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183
Minn. 135, 139, 236 N.W. 204, 206 (1931) ("punitive" or "exemplary" damages).
Other terms that are synonymous with punitive damages include vindictive, puni-

tory, penal, additional, aggravated, plenary, imaginary, presumptive, and smart money.
See, e.g., Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 52, 116 N.W.
101, 102 (1908) ("punitory or exemplary damages'); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200, 7
Gil. 128, 142 (1862) ("vindictive or exemplary damages"); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971); Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1
L.J. STUDENT B.A. OHIO ST. U. 5, 5 (1935) (now published as OHIO ST. L.J.); Levit,
Punitive Damages: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 1980 INS. L.J. 257, 257; Owen, Punitive
Damages In Products Liabdiity Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1265 n.24 (1976); Tozer,
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to compensatory damages, 3 are generally imposed upon tortfeasors for
injuries resulting from willfull, wanton, or malicious conduct. 4 An injured plaintiff, however, is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter
of right. 5 Rather, the granting of a punitive damages award, 6 and the
designation of its amount, 7 lies solely within the discretion of the jury.8
The primary purpose of punitive damages is to deter the tortfeasor
and others from engaging in similar misconduct in the future9 as well as
Punitive Damages and Products Ltability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300, 300 (1972); Note, Allowance
of Fnitvte Damages in Products L&abtKiPy Clais, 6 GA. L. REv. 613, 614 (1972).
3. See Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 529, 151
N.W.2d 422, 428 (1967) ("Punitive damages are an exception to the rule of compensatory
damages, which are based on the theory that the injured party is entitled to recover in
money damages what he has lost in order to compensate him for such loss."); Crea v.
Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284-85 (1952) (exemplary damages may be
awarded in addition to actual damages sustained); Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 239,
184 N.W. 964, 965 (1921) (punitive damages not awarded to compensate); Berg v. St. Paul
City Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W. 191, 192 (1905) (in addition to compensatory
damages jury may award further reasonable sum as exemplary damages); Hoffman v.
Northern Pac. R.R., 45 Minn. 53, 55, 47 N.W. 312, 313 (1890) (exemplary damages are
damages in excess of what may sufficiently compensate for the injury done).
4. See notes 121-44 infa and accompanying text.
5. Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284 (1952) ("exemplary
damages are not a matter of right"); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206
N.W. 171, 173 (1925) ("Punitive or exemplary damages are not damages to which a party
"); Berg v. St. Paul City Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105
is entitled as a matter of right ....
N.W. 191, 192 (1905) ("plaintiff is not entitled to such [punitive] damages as a matter of
legal right").
6. E.g., Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Minn. 1980) (appropriateness of punitive damages is within jury's discretion); Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408,
411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284 (1952) (question of allowing punitive damages is one for the
jury); Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139, 236 N.W.
204, 206 (1931) (allowance of punitive damages is for jury to determine); Kirschbaum v.
Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (1925) (jury is at liberty to grant or
withhold punitive damages); Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 238-39, 184 N.W. 964, 965
(1921) (award of punitive damages is within discretion of the jury); Johnson v. Wolf, 142
Minn. 352, 354, 172 N.W. 216, 217 (1919) (whether exemplary damages shall be allowed
rests within discretion of jury); Berg v. St. Paul City Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W.
191, 192 (1905) (award of punitive damages is within jury's discretion); Tamke v.
Vangsnes, 72 Minn. 236, 239, 75 N.W. 217, 218 (1898) (allowance of "punitory" damages
is within sound discretion of jury).
7. E.g., Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139, 236
N.W. 204, 206 (1931) (amount of exemplary damages is within the discretion of jury and
cannot be established by any fixed rule); Johnson v. Wolf, 142 Minn. 352, 355, 172 N.W.
216, 217 (1919) (amount awarded rests largely in discretion of jury); Beaulieu v. Great N.
Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 53, 114 N.W. 353, 355 (1907) (amount awarded must necessarily rest in
discretion of jury); Berg v. St. Paul City Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W. 191, 192 (1905)
(in addition to compensatory damages jury may award such exemplary damages as they
deem just).
8. See notes 6-7 supra.
9. E.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 1973) (punitive
damages are awarded to punish a person for outrageous conduct); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967) (punitive damages serve as punishment
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impose a civil punishment upon a tortfeasor.I 0 Punitive damages also
for and deterrence from socially disapproved conduct); E.H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 646 (D. Minn. 1979) (punitive damages not designed to compensate
but rather to punish); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. Tex.
1978) (primary purpose of exemplary damages is punishment and deterrence), af'd, 623
F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979)
(punitive damages are designed to punish and deter wrongdoer); Wilson v. City of Eagan,
297 N.W.2d 146, 151 (Minn. 1980) (deterrence of similar future misconduct); Caspersen v.
Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100, 213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) (punitive damages awarded to
plaintiff as punishment and deterrent); Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R.R., 45 Minn. 53, 55,
47 N.W. 312, 313 (1890) (punitive damages awarded as punishment and example); Lynd
v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 201, 7 Gil. 128, 144 (1862) (punitive damages may be allowed as
punishment and example); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77,
at 275 (1935) ("Exemplary damages are assessed for the avowed purpose of visiting punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of any loss or detriment of the plaintiff."); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 2, at 9 (punitive damages are awarded for the
"purpose of punishing the defendant" and "deterring others from following his example");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1), at 464 (1979) ("Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct
in the future."); Levit, supra note 2, at 259 (punitive damages punish defendant and deter
future wrongful conduct); Owen, supra note 2, at 1265 (punitive damages punish defendant for outrageous acts and deter him and others from such future misconduct); Richardson, A Common Law Doctrine in Need of Legislative Reform. Punitive Damages, TRIAL, Mar.
1980, at 31 (punitive damages punish and deter defendants and others from similar future
misconduct); Tozer, supra note 2, at 300 ("[P]unitive damages are still awarded . . . as
punishment for intentional and outrageous conduct of the defendant rather than to compensate the plaintiff for his injury."). But see Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should not be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46, 59-60 (1978) ("The
windfall of punitive damages may enrich an occasional plaintiff, but in real life punitive
damages do no or little real good either as punishment or deterrence.").
10. The award of punitive damages in civil actions has often been/criticized as an
improper intrusion into the domain of criminal law. The basis for this criticism is that
while the objectives of punitive damages are identical in theory to those of the criminal
courts, the defendant in a civil action is stripped of his constitutional and criminal safeguards. E.g., DuBois, Punitive Damages in PersonalInju,, Products Liability and Professional
Malpractice Cases.- Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 348 (1976) (punitive damage awards beyond statutory criminal penalties are arguably unconstitutional for lack of
legal safeguards and constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary to eighth amendment); Freifield, supra note 2, at 10 (since objective of punitive damages is identical in
theory with that of the criminal courts, and since criminal safeguards are stripped from
the civil litigant, any attempt to punish should remain with criminal courts); Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product Liabdily Cases, 15 FORUM 117, 120-21 (1979) (punitive damages
raise questions under the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, "particularly with respect to multiple punishment and double jeopardy without any of the safeguards afforded by the criminal law"); Richardson, supra note 9, at 32 (criminal actions
have the same purposes as punitive damages); Tozer, supra note 2, at 303 (punitive damages have been attacked on constitutional grounds of due process, double jeopardy, and
cruel and unusual punishment). But cf. Owen, supra note 2, at 1277-78 (rejecting notion
that injection of criminal objectives into civil law destroys "majestic symmetry" of the
law).
The late Professor McCormick, commenting on the alleged impropriety of punitive
damages in civil actions, summarized the conflict with the criminal law as follows:
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have several ancillary purposes."I First, punitive damages provide punishment in those instances in which the criminal law is either unwilling
or unable to punish the wrongdoer.' 2 Second, punitive damages provide
a private revenge, 1 3 as well as public revenge, which promotes public
peace by channeling individual retaliation into the courtroom.' 4 Third,
punitive damages encourage private plaintiffs to litigate their claims and
15
enforce the law by rewarding those who bring wrongdoers to justice.

[Ilt is alleged that to subject the defendant both to criminal prosecution and to
punishment in the form of civil punitive damages for the same act (usually an
act which is criminally punishable) exposes the defendant to "double jeopardy"
in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional prohibitions
against punishing a man twice for the same offense. Similarly, it is objected that
the jury is permitted to assess a punishment under a procedure which deprives
the person punished of the safeguards traditionally regarded as necessary in
criminal trials, such as the rule which requires the wrong to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and that which exempts the accused from being forced
to take the stand as a witness. Again, it is urged that, while fines in criminal
cases are limited by statutes, exemplary damages are limited only by the caprice
of the jurors, subject to a review by the judges only in the rare case where the
judge can find impropriety of motive or gross disproportion, and that this want
of a guiding measure leads to excess and injustice.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 276 (footnote omitted).
Although a punitive damage award in a civil action does not prevent a subsequent
criminal prosecution, this exposure of defendants to dual punishment has been justified on
several grounds. First, criminal fines may be small and readily paid by a defendant without causing him to account for the profits acquired through his wrongful conduct. See
Richardson, supra note 9, at 32. Second, criminal laws often fail to "provide a fine enough
mesh to net many wrongdoers." Id Third, overburdened prosecutors must devote their
time and efforts to "street crimes." Id Fourth, "[J]uries are often reluctant to apply harsh
remedies and stigmatize defendants with criminal convictions." Id See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 275-78.
11. See notes 12-17 tnfia and accompanying text.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 118-19 (punitive damages permit compensation for
damage to emotional tranquility); Levit, supra note 2, at 259 (revenge as justification for
punitive damages); Owen, supra note 2, at 1279 (victim vents outrage by extracting a
judicial fine); Richardson, supra note 9, at 31 (punitive damages are a substitute for selfhelp); Tozer, supra note 2, at 300 (punitive damages permit plaintiff's revenge in the courtroom).
14. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 133 (punitive damages as a form of revenge for the
public at large) (quoting Owen, supra note 2, at 1280); Owen, supra note 2, at 1280 (same);
Richardson, supra note 9, at 31 (punitive damages provide "peaceful method of purging
angry responses to illegal harm"); Tozer, supra note 2, at 300 ("Nor can there be any doubt
that punitive damages have helped to maintain public tranquility by permitting the insulted plaintiff to take his revenge in the courtroom rather than in the alley."); Note, supra
note 2, at 615 ("punitive damages allow the jury to express its indignation at the actions of
the wrongdoer, thus affording the community itself a sort of public or collective revenge').
15. E.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 49 n.18 (Alaska 1979) (recognizing
that punitive damages "reward the private plaintiff for enforcing the rules of law against
one who otherwise would not be coerced into observing those rules"); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 9, at 278 (incentive to litigate as a principal advantage of punitive damages);
Owen, supra note 2, at 1287. Professor Owen explains that the prospect of receiving punitive damages motivates reluctant plaintiffs to press their claims thereby serving as a law
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Fourth, punitive damages compensate those plaintiffs whose actual damages exceed the compensatory damages awarded or whose recovery has
been substantially depleted by attorney's fees.16 Finally, punitive damages serve as a reformative device by teaching tortfeasors to respect society's legal values, while mandating atonement for their wrongful conduct
through economic suffering.m7
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld punitive damage
awards in a wide variety of actions,18 until recently the court had never
addressed the question of whether punitive damages are recoverable in
products liability actions.19 In the recent case of Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson
enforcement tool in two respects. Punitive damage awards encourage plaintiffs to proceed
as "private attorneys general" thereby bringing wrongdoers to justice. Id. at 1287-88.
Also, awarding punitive damages assures implementation of the rules of substantive law.
Id. at 1288-89; Richardson, supra note 9, at 31 (punitive damages encourage legal actions
in which, because of the small amount of compensatory damages involved, suit would not
ordinarily be pursued); Note, supra note 2, at 628-29 (punitive damages as an incentive to
litigate).
In a recent action arising from the shooting of a pet cat prior to the lapse of a statutory impoundment period, the Minnesota Supreme Court.acknowledged that punitive
damages encourage plaintiffs to litigate their claims inthose cases in which compensatory
damages are so small that citizens and attorneys ordinarily would be reluctant to seek
recovery. Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 151 (Minn. 1980). Punitive damages
are particularly appropriate in such cases because the small compensatory damage awards
will not adequately serve to deter similar misconduct in the future. Id.
16. E.g., Levit, supra note 2, at 259 (punitive damages as additional compensation);
Owen, supra note 2, at 1295-96. Professor Owen emphasizes that while punitive damages
are not designed to compensate plaintiffs they do play a residual compensatory role. Id.
For instance, punitive damages help reimburse plaintiffs for losses that a plaintiff is unable
to prove or for which the rule of damages does not permit relief, and for the expenses
incurred in pursuing the lawsuit. Id.at 1296. Furthermore, punitive damages help pay
attorneys fees not otherwise recoverable under the law. Id at 1297; cf. Note, supra note 2,
at 628-29 (punitive damages rarely sufficient to cover litigation expenses).
17. Owen, supra note 2, at 1281.
18. E.g., Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Minn. 1980) (unlawful
killing of pet cat prior to lapse of statutory impoundment period); Cherne Indus., Inc. v.
Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 95-96 (Minn. 1979) (breach of employment
agreement); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 99, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330-31 (1973) (assault and battery); Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361, 364, 191 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1971)
(conversion); Sweeney v. Meyers, 199 Minn. 21, 24, 270 N.W. 906, 907 (1937) (wrongful
eviction); Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139, 236
N.W. 204, 206 (1931) (wrongful eviction); Krienke v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 182 Minn. 549,
555, 235 N.W. 24, 27 (1931) (malicious prosecution); Johnson v. Wolf, 142 Minn. 352, 35455, 172 N.W. 216, 217 (1919) (trespass to realty); Manion v. Jewel Tea Co., 135 Minn.
250, 253-54, 160 N.W. 767, 768 (1916) (slander); Grimestad v. Lofgren, 105 Minn. 286,
293-94, 117 N.W. 515, 518 (1908) (abuse of process); Gardner v. Minea, 47 Minn. 295,
296-97, 50 N.W. 199, 199-200 (1891) (trespass to personalty); Gardner v. Kellogg, 23
Minn. 463, 468 (1877) (indecent assault); Fox v. Stevens, 13 Minn. 272, 277, 13 Gil. 252,
255 (1868) (seduction); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-02, 7 Gil. 128, 142-44 (1862)
(wrongful levy).
19. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn. 1980). The court
stated that "[tihis case presents the question, not heretofore considered by this court, of whether

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 11
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW[

Corp.,

20

[Vol. 7

the Minnesota Supreme Court was afforded the opportunity to

address this highly-debated issue.21
In G0c, the four-year-old plaintiff was wearing pajamas made from a
fabric manufactured by the defendant. 22 Although this fabric, commercially known as "flannelette," was made of 100% untreated cotton, it
nevertheless met the minimum federal standards for product flammability. 23 As the plaintiff reached across the electric stove in the family
punitive damages may be appropriately awarded in the context of a strict liability action." Id. (emphasis added).
The only other Minnesota case involving punitive damages in a products liability
action, Oakhurst, Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., No. 27015 (Minn. 3d Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 1978) (trial
court memorandum) was settled prior to appeal. The action in Oakhurst arose out of an
explosion and fire that destroyed a hog farrowing complex. See id, slip op. at 1. The
plaintiff alleged strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty and sought punitive
damages for the defendants' use of the product Styrofoam in the construction of the hog
complex. Id. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $489,900 and a total of
$900,000 in punitive damages against two of the defendants. Id, slip op. at 2. The trial
court concluded that punitive damages were warranted because of the defendants' knowledge of the Styrofoam's high flammability when used in the sandwich panel construction
found in the hog complex and because of the decision by the defendants' high level executives to withhold relevant test data from salesmen and consumers. Id, slip op. at 69.
In rendering its opinion, the trial court also engaged in an excellent discussion of the
background of punitive damages in Minnesota and why such awards are appropriate in
products liability actions. See generalo id, slip op. at 63-80.
20. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980).
21. During the past decade numerous commentators have spoken out on the propriety of awarding punitive damages in products liability actions. Professor Owen, who has
written the most comprehensive article in this area, see Owen, supra note 2, concludes that
punitive damages are both appropriate and necessary in products liability actions. Id at
1371. The same position has been taken by other commentators as well. E.g., Igoe, humlive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 24, 29
(1978) (punitive damages will contribute to greater product safety); Richardson, supra
note 9, at 30 (favoring punitive damages in products liability cases provided that a "rational reconstruction" is forthcoming); Robinson & Kane, Punitve Damages in the Products
Case, TRIAL, Jan. 1979, at 36 (jolicy considerations militate in favor of punitive damages
in products liability actions); Note, supra note 2, at 629-30 (approving of punitive damages
in products liability actions despite the problems involved). Other commentators, however, have sharply criticized any extension of punitive damage awards to products liability
actions. E.g., Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 64-65 (urging abolition of punitive
damages in all tort litigation); Fulton, supra note 10, at 135-36 (strict liability and punitive
damages are incompatible); Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Stnct Liability Cases, 61
MARQ. L. REV. 244, 251 (1977) (punitive damages are inconsistent with theory of strict
liability and contrary to public policy); Synman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Cases, 44 INS. COUNSELJ. 402, 406-07 (1977) (punitive damages are incompatible
with products liability); Tozer, supra note 2, at 301 (strict liability and punitive damages
are not compatible).
22. 297 N.W.2d at 729.
23. Id The defendant argued that the fabric's compliance with the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953, is U.S.C. §§ 1191-204 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979),
precluded a finding of a guilty state of mind necessary for a punitive damages award. 297
N.W.2d at 733. Under the Flammable Fabrics Act, a fabric is properly saleable in interstate commerce if it has passed a flammability test termed CS 191-53. Id The fabric in
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home to shut off a timer,24 her pajamas came in contact with a lighted
burner on the stove and ignited instantly.25 The pajama top burned for
an estimated eight to twelve seconds before it was extinguished.26 As a
result, the plaintiff suffered severe second- and third-degree burns and
27
permanent scars over twenty percent of her body.
The plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of the fabric based
on strict products liability. 28 The trial court entered judgment against
the defendant for $750,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in
the Gryc pajamas passed the test. Id Therefore, the defendant argued, its actions in
placing the pajamas on the market were justified. Id
The court rejected this contention and upheld the findings of the trial court. Id. at
734. First, the flammability test used under the Act was not a valid indicator of the flammable characteristics of fabrics and failed to account for the uses to which a fabric would
be put in determining its safety. Id. Second, Congress intended the test to protect the
public only from certain highly flammable synthetic products, not all types of unreasonably dangerous clothing. Id Third, because the test was originally adopted through the
textile industry's influence, it protected the industry rather than the public. Id. Fourth,
the evidence indicated that the defendant knew that the test was invalid and that unreasonably dangerous fabrics could pass the test. As one of the defendant's top officials wrote
in a memorandum entitled "Flammability-Liability," "We are always sitting on somewhat of a powder keg as regards our flannelette being so inflammable." Id
Based upon these four factors, the court concluded that while the defendant's compliance with the Act's flammability test was relevant to the issue of punitive damages, it did
not preclude such an award as a matter of law. Id at 734-35.
The defendant also asserted that because the fabric complied with the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act, the state court, by awarding punitive damages, would be applying an
inconsistent law that was preempted by the Act. Id at 735. Consequently, an award of
punitive damages would violate both the Act and the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. Id The Gyc court concluded, however, that because Congress did
not expressly intend to preempt state private civil remedies, such as punitive damages, and
because no preemption could be implied, the preemption argument was without merit.
See id at 735-38.
For a general discussion of Giyc and related cases in other jurisdictions, see 23 ATLA.
L. REP. 250, 250-52 (1980). Also cited are numerous authorities critical of the flammability tests used under the Act, id at 251, and authorities that discuss the issues of
federal preemption and the recovery of punitive damages in products liability cases. Id at
251-52.
24. 297 N.W.2d at 729.
25. See id at 729-30.
26. Id at 729.
27. Id
28. See id at 730. The plaintiff contended that the fabric was defective and claimed
that their evidence tended to show: the cotton flannelette was unreasonably dangerous for
use in children's pajamas because of its highly flammable characteristics; flame-retardant
chemicals that could have increased the product's safety were commercially available;
other inherently flame-retardant synthetics could have been used in the pajamas instead
of the cotton flannelette; manufacturers, sellers, and consumers should have been warned
of the fabric's flammable characteristics; consumers should have been informed of a simple
home remedy that could easily be used to flame retard the cotton flannelette after each
washing. Id
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punitive damages.2 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's award, and concluded that there was substantial evidence from
which the jury could find that the defendant had acted in "willful, wanton and/or malicious disregard of the rights of others."3 0 The Gryc court
considered eight factors that reflected on the defendant's conduct and
the appropriateness of a punitive damages award. 31 Among the three
factors the court emphasized was the danger of the product to the public.
The court concluded that this danger was substantial because the cotton
flannelette ignited instantaneously and burned with nearly the rapidity
of newsprint. 32 The court also noted the evidence regarding the feasibility of reducing the flammability hazard and stated that although there
was contrary evidence at trial, "plaintiffs' experts provided credible evidence." 3 3 In addition, the court found that the defendant failed to issue
any warning with the garment even though a warning would have been
inexpensive and simple to provide.34 Finally, the court emphasized the
29. Id at 729.
30. Id at 739.
31. Id The factors that the Ggc court considered included:
1. The existence and magnitude of the product danger to the public;
2. The cost or feasibility of reducing the danger to an acceptable level;
3. The manufacturer's awareness of the danger, the magnitude of the danger,
and the availability of a feasible remedy;
4. The nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the manufacturer's failure
to act appropriately to discover or reduce the danger;
5. The extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created the danger;
6. The extent to which the defendants are subject to federal safety regulation;
7. The probability that compensatory damages might be awarded against defendants in other cases; and, finally,
8. The amount of time which has passed since the actions sought to be deterred.
Id These eight factors were derived from Professor Owen's article, see Owen, supra note 2,
at 1369, in which he states that these factors reflect many of the considerations pertinent
to both whether punitive damages should be assessed in the first place, and the measurement of such damages. Id at 1369 n.529.
32. See 297 N.W.2d at 739. In a reconstruction of the accident, it was found that the
front of the cotton flannelette burned from hem to neck in four to five seconds. 'Id at 730.
In a similar experiment conducted with pajamas made from newsprint, the pajamas
burned only slightly faster. Id Nevertheless, the defendant contended that the cotton
flannelette was not unreasonably dangerous because the fabric complied with the Federal
Flammable Fabrics Act. See note 23 supra. Plaintiffs' experts concluded, based on the
results of these experiments, that the untreated cotton flannelette was unreasonably dangerous for use in children's sleepwear. 297 N.W.2d at 730. Defendants' experts concluded
that the fabric in the Gryc pajamas was not defective because the burn characteristics that
were demonstrated by plaintiffs' experts were normal for cotton and materials derived
from cotton, such as flannelette. Id. at 730-31.
33. Id at 739. The defendant claimed that there were no flame-retardant chemicals
that could be used to treat the cotton flannelette without adversely affecting the qualities
of the fabric and its saleability. Id at 730.
34. See id at 739-40. The defendants argued that a warning was not feasible because
it would "stigmatize" the cotton flannelette. Id at 740. The Gyc court concluded that
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defendant's knowledge of the flammability hazard. 35 A memorandum
written by one of the defendant's top officials revealed that a number of
clothing fires had caused injuries to persons wearing the defendant's cotton flannelette and stated that the defendant was "sitting on a powder
keg with respect to the flammability of the cotton flannelette. " 3 6 In addition, a letter written by one of the defendant's officials acknowledged
that the cotton flannelette had been successfully flame-retarded in experiments but because of the cost involved the defendant would not use
flame retardants until federal law so required.3 7 The Gryc court therefore
inferred from the evidence that the defendant was "uniquely aware" of
the flammability hazard and yet, for purely economic reasons, failed to
take feasible corrective measures. 38 Accordingly, the Gryc court affirmed
the trial court's judgment and with no apparent hesitancy extended punitive damages to products liability actions.
This Comment will explore the background of punitive damages in
products liability actions, the Minnesota Supreme Court's rationale for
extending punitive damages to products liability actions, the policy considerations addressed by the court, the proper standard for punitive damage awards and a suggested application of this standard in the products
liability context.
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES

A plaintiff io a products liability action ordinarily may seek to recover
under separate or collective theories of negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability.3 9 Although the earliest products liability cases were
this assertion essentially admitted that defendant was "protecting the marketing of a product consumers might deem unreasonably dangerous." Id
35. Id
36. Id at 734.
37. Id at 740.
38. Id at 739-40.
39. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1973) (negligence and strict liability); Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973) (negligence and
breach of express and implied warranties); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d
832, 834 (2d Cir. 1967) (negligence); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (strict liability), afd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Vollert v. Summa Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (D. Hawaii 1975) (negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (negligence,
breach of implied warranty, and strict liability); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d
655, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (negligence and strict liability); Owen, supra note 2, at 126877; Note, supra note 2, at 616-20.
In Minnesota, plaintiffs generally tend to plead alternative theories of negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability. See, e.g., Bigham v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d
892, 896 (Minn. 1978) (neglience, breach of warranty, and strict liability); O'Laughlin v.
Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 827 (Minn. 1977) (negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977)
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brought under theories of negligence and breach of warranty, 40 since the
early 1960's strict liability often has been considered to be a more advantageous theory of recovery in products liability lawsuits. 4 ' Strict liability
theory requires the plaintiff to prove only that the product causing the
injury was in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property." '4 2 A major justification underlying the
theory of strict products liability is that a manufacturer is better able to
bear the losses caused by a defective product because a manufacturer is
in a position to remedy the defect or equitably distribute the losse.q to
43
consumers when injuries do occur.
(negligence and strict liability); Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn.
48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976) (negligence and strict liability); Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota." The Theoris of Recovery, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1980).
40. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 96-97, at 641-56. See generally Steenson, supra
note 39, at 7-14 (discussion of historical development of products liability law in Minnesota).
41. The first cases dealing with the concept of strict liability in defective products
cases were Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (setting
forth the rationale for strict products liability) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (setting out the fundamental rules of
strict liability).
In 1967 the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the concept of strict products liability
in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 337-40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-501 (1967)
(child scalded by water when vaporizer was tipped over). In subsequent decisions, the
Minnesota court adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) as the standard for strict liability in Minnesota. See, e.g., Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 291 Minn. 105,
110, 189 N.W.2d 701, 705 (1971); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn.
321, 328-29, 188 N.W.2d 426, 431-32 (1971); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn.
83, 88-89, 179 N.W.2d 64, 68 (1970).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement sets forth the
requirements for strict tort liability as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 75, at 492-96.
43. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The
Henningsen court stated the fundamental rationale for the doctrine of strict products liability:
[W]here the commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they will
be dangerous to life or limb, then society's interests can only be protected by
eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and
the reasonably expected ultimate consumer. In that way the burden of losses
consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a position
to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when
they do occur.
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The first products liability case to consider an award of punitive damages was Fleet v. Hollenkemp,44 decided in 1852. In Fleet, which involved
the sale of an adulterated drug, the Kentucky court upheld the trial
court's instruction on exemplary damages and affirmed a general verdict
for the plaintiff. 45 The next such case, Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn ,46 did not
arise until 1937. Although the cause of action in Gunn was for deceit and
breach of contract, 47 the case was characteristic of a products liability
for property damage
action because the plaintiff sought to recover
48
caused by the sale of a defective product.
Despite the decisions in Fleet and Gunn, however, few courts considered
awarding punitive damages in products liability cases until the 1967 decision of Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,In.4 9 In Rogt'nsky the plaintiff suffered scaling, rashes, and loss of hair after using the defendant's drug
MER/29 for several months.5o Subsequently, the plaintiff developed
"disturbing eye symptoms" that were later diagnosed as cataracts. 5' The
plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against the defendant
Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.
A similar rationale for strict products liability was adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
In McCormack the court stated:
[E]nlarging a manufacturer's liability to those injured by its products more adequately meets public-policy demands to protect customers from the inevitable
risks of bodily harm created by mass production and complex marketing conditions. In a case such as this, subjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof
of negligence or privity of contract, as the rule intends, imposes the cost of injury
resulting from a defective product upon the maker, who can both most effectively reduce or eliminate the hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on
such costs, instead of upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the
means necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of injury or its
disastrous consequences.
Ird at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. See also Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290
Minn. 321, 327-28, 188 N.W.2d 426, 431-32 (1971) (citing public interest in safety, distribution of losses, maximizing legal protection and decreased time and expense in litigation
as the justifications for strict liability); Steenson, supra note 39, at 13 ("Concepts of deterrence, superior manufacturer loss spreading ability, and a recognition of the consumer's
relative position in the marketplace provided the principal justifications for the adoption
of strict tort in Minnesota.").
44. 52 Ky. 219, 13 B. Mon. 175 (1852).
45. See id. at 230, 13 B. Mon. at 184.
46. 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937).
47. See id. at 599, 176 So. at 332.
48. The plaintiff in Gunn brought suit for damage caused to his automobile through
the-use of defendant's adulterated motor oil. See 234 Ala. at 600, 176 So. at 333. See also
Owen, supra note 2, at 1326 n.333 (categorizing Gunn as a deceit action based upon the
fraudulent sale of a "defective" product); Note, supra note 2, at 622-23 (recognizing Gunn
as an early hybrid case standing somewhere between consumer fraud and products liability).
49. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
50. See id. at 836. The drug MER/29 was developed by the defendant to lower blood
cholesterol levels. See id at 835.
51. See id. at 836.
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based upon theories of negligence and fraud upon the Food and Drug
Administration.52 The jury awarded compensatory damages of $17,500
and punitive damages of $100,000. 53 On appeal, the Second Circuit held

that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of punitive damages to the jury,54 because under New York's recklessness standard punitive damages could be awarded only for conduct that was close to
criminality. 5 Moreover, such reckless conduct had to be clearly established.56 Thus, the Roginsky court reversed the punitive damages award
notwithstanding evidence that some of the defendant's corporate officers
knew that the drug had dangerous side effects, yet failed to inform the
Food and Drug Administration, the medical profession, or the general
57
public of the danger.
Striking down the punitive damages award, Judge Friendly set forth
several reasons why punitive damage awards should not be extended to
products liability litigation. Among these reasons was the danger that in
multiple plaintiff products liability cases, multiple punitive damage
awards for a manufacturer's single defective product were likely to subject the manufacturer to excessive punishment or even bankruptcy. 58
The court reasoned that in these situations heavy compensatory damage
awards and criminal penalties would provide adequate punishment and
deterrence. 59 A second reason cited by the Rog'nsky court was that the
deterrent effect of punitive damages probably would be eliminated by
the manufacturer's insuring against punitive damages. 60 Finally, the
52. See id. at 834.
53. See id
54. See id. at 835.
55. See id. at 843. The Roginsky court noted that their standard would only be met if
after the drug was marketed the manufacturer had become aware of the danger and did
nothing, "deliberately closing its eyes." Id
56. See id. at 850.
57. See id at 842-51.
58. See id at 839-41.
59. See id. at 841. The Rogi'nsky court suggested that compensatory damages already
contain a punitive element and would take on an even greater punitive role if punitive
damages, as a separate award, were eliminated. See id
60. See id; Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 21, at 251. If punitive damage awards are
allowed in products liability actions no deterrence occurs because increased insurance premiums are passed on to consumers and those companies unable to pass on costs or acquire
insurance will be forced out of business. See id For an extensive discussion of why insurance coverage for punitive damages in products liability litigation should be considered
contrary to public policy, see Owen,-supra note 2, at 1308-13.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet expressly considered whether insuring
against punitive damages is contrary to public policy. In Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn.
93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973), however, the court did hold that the language of an insurance
policy did not cover punitive damages for an assault and battery in which the insurance
company's policy only required it to pay all sums the insured would be legally obligated to
pay as damages for bodily injury. See id at 99-100, 213 N.W.2d at 331. Because the
compensatory damages awarded compensated the plaintiff for actual loss from bodily injury, the punitive damages were awarded to the plaintiff only as punishment to the de-
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court reasoned that if a manufacturer could not insure against punitive
damage awards, innocent shareholders of the manufacturer would be
1
punished for the manufacturer's single instance of wrongful conduct.6
In the same year as the Roginsky decision, however, Judge Friendly's
reasoning was rejected by a California Court of Appeal in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. 62 In Toole, which involved facts almost identical to
those in Roginsky,63 the California court disagreed with the Roginsky decision. 64 Finding that the actions of the defendant constituted reprehensible conduct, the Toole court stated:
There was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that high
level management had knowledge of wrongdoing on the part of department heads and other employees and agents ...
In our case there is evidence from which the jury could conclude that
appellant brought its drug to market, and maintained it on the market,
in reckless disregard of the possibility that it would visit serious injury
upon persons using it. Besides the falsification of test data. . . and the
withholding from the FDA and the medical profession of vital information concerning blood changes and eye opacities in test animals, there
was evidence that. . . appellant continued to represent to the medical
profession that MER/29 was a proven drug, remarkably free from side
effects, virtually non-toxic, having a specific and completely safe action.
In light of appellant's knowledge, the jury could infer that these statements were recklessly made, with wanton disregard for the safety of all
fendant and as deterrence to others. See id. at 100, 213 N.W.2d at 331. Thus, because
punitive damages were not awarded for bodily injury, no coverage was afforded under the
terms of the policy. See id
61. See 378 F.2d at 841; Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 59 ("innocent stockholders are punished"); Kircher, Products Liabih'y-Th Defense Position, 44 INS. COUNSEL J.
276, 301 (1977). But see Owen, supra note 2, at 1304. Professor Owen notes that employees
of a corporation generally market a defective product because of an intense profit motive
rather than out of animus toward consumers. See id Therefore, to the extent that the

product is excessively dangerous, the profits reaped from its sale are "excessive profits."
Id Accordingly, recovery of these excessive profits through punitive damages merely constitutes a recoupment of an unjust enrichment of a corporation and its shareholders and
does not result in the personal punishment of the corporation or its shareholders. See id
See also Robinson & Kane, supra note 21, at 35 ("penalizing shareholders is the only practical and effective means of controlling the acts of corporate directors and officers").

62. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
63. Compare id at 695-701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-08 with Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 835-36 (2d Cir. 1967).

64. See 251 Cal. App. 2d at 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17 n.3. In holding contrary
to the Rogtnsky court, the Toole court noted:
We see in our record ample evidence of conduct on the part of appellant from

which the jury could infer intentional, wilful and reckless conduct on appellant's
part, done in disregard of possible injury to persons such as respondent. The
evidence. . . clearly raised an issue on which respondent was entitled to a jury's
determination.
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who might use the drug.6 5

Accordingly, the Toole court upheld the jury's award of $175,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff through use of the defendant's drug MER/29.66
Since the Rog'nsky and Toole decisions, relatively few cases have considered the propriety of punitive damages in products liability actions.67 It
is evident from this limited case law, however, that courts are becoming
increasingly more willing to allow punitive damages in product's liability

In Gge, the Minnesota Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to
allow punitive damages in products liability cases. The Minnesota court
thus has been added to the growing number of jurisdictions willing to
65. Id at 712-14,. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 414-16.
66. See id. at 693, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403. Initially the jury in Toole awarded the plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. See id The
punitive damages award was later reduced through remittitur to $250,000 and affirmed
by the Too/e court. See id at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
67. See note 68-69 ina.
68. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 103-04 (6th Cir. 1975) (fire
caused by defective television transformer; reversing judgment n.o.v. and ordering entry of
judgment for plaintiff of $100,000 in punitive damages), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 134, 144-46 (3d Cir. 1973) (eye injuries
caused by ingesting drug chloroquine phosphate; case remanded for new trial on question
of compensatory and punitive damages); Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 446-47, 449 (10th
Cir. 1973) (damage to dairy herd from use of feed additive; affirming jury award of $9,000
compensatory and $7,500 punitive damages); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp.
955, 957-59, 961, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (driver burned because of alleged design defect in
truck's fuel tank; reversing $10,000,000 punitive damages verdict, but holding that punitive damages are appropriate in strict liability actions), aJ'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980);
Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 608, 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (death caused by
use of recreational product; defendant's motion to dismiss punitive damages claim denied); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44, 48-49 (Alaska 1979) (manufacturing
and design defect in revolver; award of 5137,750 compensatory and $2,895,000 punitive
damages remanded for new trial on entire award with punitive damages not to exceed
$250,000); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 458-59, 465, 113 Cal. Rptr.
416, 421-22, 426 (1974) (crash of airplane caused by defective fuel system; affirming trial
court's order granting new trial on $17,250,000 punitive damages award); Barth v. B.F.
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 233-34, 240-41, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 307-08, 313
(1968) (automobile accident caused by defective tire; no punitive damages awarded, but
punitive damage charge held proper); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 693-94, 714-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403, 416-18 (1967) (cataracts resulting from use of
drug MER/29; punitive damages award affirmed after remittitur from $500,000 to
$250,000 by trial court); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 I11.2d 288, 290, 300, 263 N.E.2d 103,
104, 109 (1970) (loss of eyesight from spontaneous explosion of Drano can; affirming
$900,000 compensatory and $10,000 punitive damage award); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co.,
567 S.W.2d 655, 658-59, 667-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (collision caused by defective automobile accelerator; affirming verdict of $100,000 actual and $460,000 punitive damages).
But see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 834, 851 (2d Cir. 1967) (cataracts resulting from use of drug MER/29; reversing $100,000 punitive damage award).
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allow punitive damages in products liability actions.69
III.

THE RATIONALE FOR EXTENDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS

Although Gtyc was a case of first impression in Minnesota, 70 the court
discussed only briefly the rationale behind its decision to extend punitive
damage awards to products liability lawsuits. The Ggyc court generally
relied upon the decisions of other jurisdictions that already had allowed
punitive damages in products liability lawsuits, 7' but the reasoning of
Professor Owen 72 seemed to be more influential. The Gyc court took the
position set forth in Professor Owen's article that manufacturers have the
unique ability to discover and correct product hazards. 73 This ability to
protect consumers from dangerous products arises out of the manufacturer's exclusive control over the processes of design, testing, inspection,
7
and collection of data relating to the safety of a particular product. 4
The Gryc court also adopted Professor Owen's position that
[m]ost manufacturers, both from a desire to avoid liability and from
a generalized sense of social responsibility, prudently use their resources
to prevent excessively hazardous products from reaching or staying on
the market. On occasion, however, manufacturers abuse their control
over safety information and market defective products in flagrant disregard of public safety. .

.

. A legal tool is needed that will help this

type of gross misconduct, punish those manufacturers guilty of such
flagrant misbehavior, and deter all manufacturers from acting with
similar disregard for the public welfare. The punitive damages remedy
75
is such a tool.

Using this reasoning, the Gryc court held that punitive damages may be
awarded in appropriate strict liability actions.76
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS

The Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with many of the same important policy considerations that caused the Rogi'nsky court to decline to
69. Punitive damages are permitted in at least 46 of the 50 states. See DuBois, supra
note 10, at 347; Tozer, supra note 2, at 300. It is presently unclear, however, how many
states permit punitive damage awards in products liability actions. For an extensive list of
the reported and unreported cases that have considered such awards, however, see Owen,
supra note 2, at 1326-29 nn.333-34.
70. See note 19 supra.
71. See 297 N.W.2d at 732. See gmenrall' cases cited in note 68 supra.
72. Owen, supra note 2.
73. See 297 N.W.2d at 732-33.
74. Ste id
75. Id. at 733 (quoting Owen, supra note 2, at 1259-60).
76. 297 N.W.2d at 733.
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award punitive damages. The Ggyc court, however, resolved these con77
siderations in favor of awarding punitive damages.
The Gtyc court examined the problem of multiple plaintiffs seeking
punitive damage awards for a defendant's single punishable act. 78 The
danger of multiple punitive damage awards, which is peculiar to products liability actions, 79 has been a source of constant criticism.80 The
danger is that defendants are likely to suffer severe economic hardship 8 i
or even bankruptcy.8 2 The Rogztsy court acknowledged this danger by
77. Id
78. See id at 740-41.
79. See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing that multiple punitive damage awards are a procedural anomaly in products liability cases), aft'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 57
(inequity and harmful effects of civil punitive damages are multiplied many times over in
"mass disaster" situation); Kircher, supra note 61, at 301 (because most products are mass
produced, danger of multiple punishment for single product defect is present); Owen,
supra note 2, at 1314 (because of multiple lawsuits, measuring and controlling punitive
damage awards in products liability litigation is particularly difficult); Robinson & Kane,
supra note 21, at 34 (danger of excessive awards in consumer settings); Tozer, supra note 2,
at 301 (mass disaster situation produces many plaintiffs seeking punitive damages).
80. See, e.g., Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 62 ("If each plaintiff-user of a massproduced good is allowed to recover punitive damages, the cumulative effect would be
staggering."); DuBois, supra note 10, at 349 (characterizing multiple punitive damage actions arising from a single act as "double jeopardy"); Kircher, supra note 61, at 301 (recognizing multiple punishments as one factor dictating elimination of punitive damages in all
civil actions); Tozer, supra note 2, at 301 (arguing that fundamental fairness requires limitation on punitive damages in mass disaster situations); notes 81-86 infta and accompanying text. But see Owen, supra note 2, at 1322-25 (acknowledging multiple actions as a
"troublesome" aspect of punitive damages in products liability actions but nevertheless
favoring the continued use of punitive damages).
81. See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (because
exemplary award is not controlled by a single plaintiff, multiple cases can be devastating),
aJfd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); cases cited note 68 supra. For a discussion of the farreaching effects of the increased use of punitive damages, see DuBois, supra note 10, at 34951.
82. Observing that the financial danger underlying multiple punitive damage awards
is the inability effectively to limit the number and size of such awards, the Roginsy court
stated:
[T]he apparent impracticability of imposing an effective ceiling on punitive
awards in hundreds of suits in different courts may result in an aggregate which,
when piled on large compensatory damages could reach catastrophic
amounts. . . . [A] sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the
business life of a concern that has wrought much good in the past and might
otherwise have continued to do so in the future, with many innocent stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for a single management sin.
378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). The danger of bankruptcy is further magnified by past
experience which indicates that "juries are proven to act unrealistically in awarding punitive damages." Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 58.
Several commentators have also emphasized that the good of the public is not served
by forcing manufacturers out of business because the disastrous economic effects of doing
so will eventually fall upon society as a whole. See DuBois, supra note 10, at 349; Coccia &
Morrissey, supra note 9, at 60; Fulton, upra note 10, at 121.
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stating:
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on
the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering. If all recovered punitive damages in the amount here awarded these would run into tens of
millions, as contrasted with the maximum criminal penalty of "imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than
$10,000 or both . . . . We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving
how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions
83
throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.
This danger of "overkill"84 or "annihilation"85 is particularly acute in
products liability actions because, unlike traditional punitive damages
lawsuits, they often involve more than a single plaintiff. Judge Friendly
emphasized this distinction in Roginsky, in which he noted:
"Typical of the torts for which such damages may be awarded are assault and battery, libel and slander, deceit, seduction, alienation of affections, malicious prosecution, and intentional interferences with
property such as trespass, private nuisance, and conversion." . . .
What strikes one is not merely that these torts are intentional but that
usually there is but a single victim; a punitive recovery by him ends the
matter, except for such additional liability as may be provided by the
8
criminal law.

6

Although the defendant in Ggc argued that the danger of multiple punitive damages awards should preclude recovery,8 7 the Minnesota
Supreme Court dismissed this argument, noting that it had been consistently rejected by other courts and commentators.8 8 Moreover, the Gyc
court held that the likelihood of multiple punitive damage awards is not
demonstrated by present products liability case law.89 In support of this
position, the court referred to Roginsky, Toole, and a number of other
cases that arose out of a single defendant's marketing of the drug
MER/29: 9o
[A] contrary conclusion can be drawn from the MER/29 litigation, the
83. 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
84. Id
85. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974). See
DuBois, supra note 10, at 349 ("economic annihilation by successive punitive verdicts");
Fulton, supra note 10, at 119 (suggests that new punitive damages standards are developing because traditional standards are inadequate to meet the demands of advocates who
seek to "annihilate as well as to punish").
86. 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967) (citation omitted).
87. See 297 N.W.2d at 740; Brief for Appellant at 79-82.
88. 297 N.W.2d at 740-41 & n.7. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975) (rejecting argument that punitive damages are inappropriate
in products liability actions "simply because there might be other suits filed against defendant" (emphasis in original)); cases cited note 68 supra. See generally Igoe, supra note 21;
Owen, supra note 2; Robinson & Kane, supra note 21; Note, supra note 2.
89. See 297 N.W.2d at 740-41.
90. Id at 740 & n.7. At the time Roginsky was heard there were 75 other cases pending in the same district and hundreds of actions had been filed in other jurisdictions for
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only mass disaster products liability litigation that has run its course.
While some 1,500 claims were filed against the manufacturer in that
case, only eleven were tried to a jury verdict. Out of these, only seven
were decided for the plaintiff, and only three of these included awards
for punitive damages, one of which was reversed on appeal. No doubt
many claims were settled out of court. Yet if this is an example of the
most crushing punishment that will befall a manufacturer guilty of
flagrant marketing misbehavior-and it is difficult to imagine a more
extreme case of such misbehavior than that of Richardson-Merrell in
marketing MER/29-then the threat of bankrupting a manufacturer
with punitive damage awards in mass disaster litigation appears to be
more theoretical than real. 9 1
The court also noted that the defendant was protected from excessive
punishment because the manufacturer's wealth or poverty and the degree to which it had already been punished were factors considered in
the decision to uphold the amount of the award. 92 Furthermore, these
same considerations would remain relevant in future actions against the
defendant. 93 Thus, in spite of the growing number and size of punitive

damage awards in products liability actions, 94 the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that the danger of overkill was an unrealistic fear that
could be minimized through judicial safeguards.
The Gyc court also examined the defendant's contention that the deterrent of punitive damages was unnecessary. The defendant argued
that because a heavy compensatory damage award admonishes a defendant and reinstates a plaintiff to his original position, punitive damages
were unnecessary. 95 Furthermore, the adverse publicity arising out of a
large compensatory damage award, coupled with damage to a defendant's reputation and concurrent loss of sales, should provide sufficient
injuries caused by the drug MER/29. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d
832, 834 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. 297 N.W.2d at 740-41 (quoting Owen, supra note 2, at 1324-25). The Task Force
that drafted the proposed Uniform Product Liability Act noted that under the Product
Liability Closed Claim Survey conducted by the Insurance Services Office in 1976-1977
the number of cases in which punitive damages were imposed was not substantial enough
to justify the concern of product sellers over the impact of punitive damages. See Fulton,
supra note 10, at 123-24.
92. See 297 N.W.2d at 741. These same considerations for awarding punitive damages have been incorporated into Minnesota's newly enacted punitive damages statute.
and accompanying text.
See notes 176-81 infta
93. See id

94. See, e.g., cases cited note 68 supra. Commentators generally agree that there is a
trend toward granting large punitive damage awards in products liability actions. See
DuBois, supra note 10, at 346; Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 21, at 245; Heins, Statutory
Changes in Minnesota Tort Law--1978, 48 HENNEPIN LAw. 6, 6 (1978); Owen, supra note 2,

at 1261; Tozer, supra note 2, at 301.
95. See Brief for Appellant at 82-83, Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727
(Minn. 1980).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss1/11

18

1981]

et al.: Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A Look at a Newly
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

deterrence. 96 In addition, the defendant submitted that because it no
longer manufactured the potentially dangerous product, the need for de97
terrence had been eliminated.
Rejecting the defendant's contentions, the Ggc court emphasized that
the defendant had acted in reckless disregard of the public in the past, 98
and furthermore, had acted purely for its own economic benefit.99 Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant had misperceived the
true function of punitive damages. 100 Punitive damages serve as punishment for past misconductiO, as well as a deterrent from future wrongful
acts.' 02 Because the potential of compensatory damages, loss of reputation and loss of sales did not adequately prevent the defendant's past
misconduct, the Giyc court concluded that punitive damages were necessary to deter future misconduct. 0 3 The court also concluded that to
award punitive damages for the defendant's past misconduct would serve
the punishment function.10 4
Despite the persuasiveness of the court's argument, the defendant's position is not without support. Many commentators claim that the need
for punitive damages has ceased because compensatory damages now
provide compensation for all of the elements of damages that punitive
damages were originally designed to cover.' 0 5 As one commentator
points out, courts in most states include medical bills, loss of earnings,
expenses reasonably connected with physical recovery, temporary and
permanent diminution in the plaintiff's ability to earn an income, and
pain and suffering in their jury instructions on compensatory damages. 106 Furthermore, such compensatory damage awards should quell
96. See 297 N.W.2d at 741; Brief for Appellant at 83-84.
97. See 297 N.W.2d at 741. The defendant also argued that because the Federal
Flammable Fabrics Act, see note 23 supra, now has more stringent standards than when
the cause of action arose, no deterrent was necessary. See id
98. See id
99. See id
100. See id
101. See id.; notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
102. See 297 N.W.2d at 741; notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
103. See 297 N.W.2d at 741.
104. Seeid.
105. See Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 46; Fulton, supra note 10, at 120; Kircher,
supra note 61, at 301. One commentator who argued that the need for punitive damages
in personal injury actions no longer existed concluded that:
Where there are or may be many plaintiffs claiming injuries from the same
product, multiple compensatory damage awards, together with the legal costs
and disruption of business attendant on the defense of the many suits will visit
upon the manufacturer all the punishment and all the deterrence any fair mind
could desire. Surely the damage done to the reputation and the treasury of
Richardson-Merrell by the MER/29 suits, even without the several awards of
punitive damages, served to make that corporate disaster an example for the
entire drug industry.
Tozer, supra note 2, at 304. See generally Richardson, su/ra note 9, at 32.
106. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 134. But see Robinson & Kane, supra note 21, at 35
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the plaintiff's outrage and reduce frustration over the apparent inability
to hold an anonymous corporation accountable for its wrongdoing.107
Consequently, it may be argued that punitive damages provide plaintiffs
with a windfall and impose unwarranted liability on manufacturers and
ultimately on society as a whole.' 08
In light of these arguments, the Ggc court's decision to extend punitive
damages into the realm of products liability was significant. The decision was important because it demonstrated that the court was willing to
punish manufacturers that act in willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of
the rights of others in the marketing of their products.10 9 In addition,
the court implicitly rejected any notion that punitive damages and strict
liability are incompatible doctrines,'10 again apparently following the
reasoning of Professor Owen. II According to the incompatability argument, "[in strict liability the character of the defendants' act is of no
consequence; in the punitive damages claim the character of the act is
paramount.",12 Professor Owen contends that this charge of incompatibility misperceives the role of fault in products liability law because
rather than eliminating fault from strict liability, the theory of strict liability expands fault by implicitly extending liability to encompass even
innocent manufacturers of defective products.'1 3 Moreover, the incompatibility argument improperly assumes that punitive damage claims are
(punitive damages compensate victims whose actual losses exceed the compensatory damages permitted by law); notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 134. Fulton also suggests, contrary to Professor
Owen, see notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text, that the financial incentive to uncover conduct warranting punitive damages and the recovery of attorney's fees need not
arise from a punitive damages award. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 134. Rather, such
incentive may be found in attorney's fees recovered through prosecution of a consumer
protection act violation. Set id
108. See Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 64 ("Society can no longer tolerate the
allowance of punitive damages in multimillions of dollars. . . . [T]he punitive damages
doctrine seriously affects not only manufacturers, but every industry, every professional
man or woman, and in fact every person in the United States."); Ghiardi & Koehn, supra
note 21, at 250, ("[A] punitive damages recovery in a products liability case results in
punishing the public, not the wrongdoer."); f Kircher, supra note 61, at 301 ("[T]he 'punishment' of punitive damages is borne by the company's stockholders. . . or, more likely,
by the buyers of the company's products.").
109. See note 120 infta.

110. 297 N.W.2d at 732-33.
111. Owen, supra note 2, at 1268-77.
112. Tozer, supra note 2, at 301, citing Rice, Exemplaq Damages in Private Consumer Aclions, 55 IOwA L. REV. 307, 309, 315 (1969).
One commentator, who contends that strict liability and punitive damages are incompatible, notes that because liability is based upon the condition of the product and
because the character of defendant's act is of no consequence, punitive damages create a
windfall and unjust enrichment for the plaintiff rather than spreading the risk of loss as is
contemplated under the theory of strict liability. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 121-22. See
alro Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 21, at 249-51; Synman, supra note 21, at 406-07.
113. See Owen, supra note 2, at 1269.
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established by the same facts that support a claim for compensatory
damages. An award of punitive damages does not depend upon whether
the action brought is based upon strict liability or some other theory of
recovery, but focuses solely upon the severity of an injury and the manner in which it was inflicted, whether by recklessness, willfulness, or with
malice.' 1 4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently adopted this position
when it considered the incompatibility argument in Drake v. Wham-O
Manufacturing Co. :115

Where the principal claim is based on strict liability in tort and there is
an additional claim of wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, it is a
simple matter to allow the plaintiff to make a supplementary showing
of aggravating conduct for the purpose of proving entitlement to punitive damages.' 16
Furthermore, using similar reasoning, courts have long awarded punitive
damages in cases involving various causes of action based on principles of
strict liability. As Professor Owen notes, punitive damages have often
been awarded in cases of nuisance, trespass to land, liability for ultrahazardous activities, negligence per se, defamation, and implied warranty in the sale of drugs."17
Thus, because the Gryc court failed to mention the incompatibility issue and because the recent trend has been to permit punitive damages in
strict liability actions, it is apparent that, like Professor Owen, the Minnesota Supreme Court does not seriously question the compatibility of
punitive damages with products liability actions.
V.

THE COMMON LAW PUNITIVE DAMAGES

STANDARD

Although the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Gyc finally resolved the issue of whether punitive damages are appropriate in the
products liability context, the decision left a major question unresolved.
In Grc, the supreme court did not address the issue of the proper standard for an award of punitive damages in a products liability lawsuit.
114. See la.; W. PROSSER, supra note 2,

§

2, atl 1 ("it is not so much the particular tort

committed as the defendant's motives and conduct in committing it which will be important as the basis of the award").
115. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
116. Id at 611; accord, Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (dismissing incompatability argument stating "simultaneous pursuit of actual
damages bottomed on principles of strict liability and exemplary damages bottomed on
fault concepts are essentially matters of trial efficiency and presents no true substantive
issues"), aft'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655,
668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (expressly finding no fundamental reason for excluding products
liability cases from cases in which punitive damages are recoverable); Hilber v. Roth, 395
Pa. 270, 276, 149 A.2d 648, 652 (1959) ("The right to punitive damages is a mere incident
to a cause of action-an element which the jury may consider in making its determination-and not the subject of an action itself.").
117. See Owen, supra note 2, at 1270-71.
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The standard that the trial court used, one of wanton or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights as demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence, is the traditional common-law standard for punitive damages
9
in Minnesota. 118 This standard was also used by the Gyc court."1 The
Ggc court, however, concluded that substantial evidence indicated that
the defendant had acted in "willful, wanton, and/or malicious disregard
of the rights of others." 20 This imprecise application of the punitive
damages standard is characteristic of Minnesota's punitive damages case
law, which has left the standard for punitive damages in a state of uncertainty. This uncertainty and imprecision is demonstrated by three distinct trends.
First, the supreme court frequently has applied a punitive damages
12 1
This
standard based upon willful, wanton, and malicious conduct.
123
22
malice,
fundamental standard1 focuses upon the essential element of
118. See notes 121-45 infra and accompanying text.
119. See 297 N.W.2d at 739. On appeal the defendant attempted to argue that the
"reckless disregard" standard was improperly applied and that the proper burden of proof
should have been that of clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance of
the evidence. See id at 738. The G6,c court, however, refused to consider these arguments
on appeal because the defendant failed to raise them at trial or in its post-trial motions.
Id
120. 297 N.W.2d at 739. The Ggic court's opinion variously referred to the standard
for punitive damages as conduct which was "willful or reckless," id. at 739, "willfully,
wantonly, or maliciously" done, id. at 736, "willful, wanton and reckless," id. at 737, and
conduct which was in "willful, wanton and/or maiicious disregard of the rights of others,"
i. at 739.
121. See, e.g., Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 528-29,
151 N.W.2d 422, 427 (1967); Butler v. Whitman, 193 Minn. 150, 152, 258 N.W. 165, 166
(1934); Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139, 236 N.W.
204, 206 (1931); Johnson v. Lindquist, 177 Minn. 270, 271, 224 N.W. 839, 839 (1929);
Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 238, 184 N.W. 964, 965 (1921); Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 51, 116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908); Vine v.
Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W. 158, 159 (1902); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-02, 7
Gil. 128, 143-44 (1862). See also Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. Hahn, Inc., 480 F.2d 482, 491
(8th Cir. 1973).
122. The punitive damages standard originally adopted in Minnesota was established
by the court in the 1862 case of Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 7 Gil. 128 (1862). In Lynd,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defendant's attachment of plaintiff's horses,
knowing that the horses were exempt from attachment, constituted willful and malicious
conduct. Id at 200, 7 Gil. at 143. Since Lyrd, the Minnesota Supreme Court has added
the element of wantonness to the fundamental punitive damages standard. See cases cited
note 126 in~fa.
123. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 95 (Minn.
1979) (malice necessary for imposition of punitive damages is defined as intentional doing
of a harmful act without legal justification); Easton Farmers Elevator Co. v. Chromalloy
Am. Corp., 310 Minn. 568, 579, 246 N.W.2d 705, 712 (1976) (per curiam) (willful and
wanton misrepresentations were insufficient for punitive damages absent proof of actual
malice); Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 410, 196 N.W.2d 478, 480 (1972) (per curiam)
(malice is necessary component of the wrong which will support exemplary damages);
Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 528-29, 151 N.W.2d

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss1/11

22

et al.: Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A Look at a Newly

1981]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

which may be demonstrated either expressly or implicitly through the
nature of the tort itself.'24 Although the Minnesota court generally has
defined willful'

25

and wanton1 26 to mean intentional conduct, 2 7 that is,

422, 427 (1967) (punitive damages intended as punishment for willfully wrongful act,
done with malice). But see Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of America, 104
Minn. 49, 52, 116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908). The Anderson court upheld ajury instruction for
assault that omitted the term malicious. Although the court admitted that "willful" and
"unlawful" do not always imply malice, it held that requiring the term malicious to be
included in the instruction would unduly restrict the cases in which exemplary damages
are recoverable. Id In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brown argued that a jury instruction
based on "willful" and "unlawful" conduct alone lacked "the essential element of malice."
Id. at 53, 116 N.W. at 103 (Brown, J.,dissenting). Consequently, Justice Brown felt that
punitive damages may have been awarded for merely "intentional and unlawful" conduct. Id at 54, 116 N.W. at 103 (Brown, J., dissenting).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated that malice may not be essential to the
punitive damages standard by phrasing the willful, wanton, and malicious standard disjunctively. See Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284 (1952) (assault
and battery committed wantonly or maliciously); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233,
236, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (1925) (punitive damages are punishment or deterrent for willful,
wanton, or malicious wrongs); Hiveley v. Golnick, 123 Minn. 498, 502, 144 N.W. 213, 215
(1913) (plaintiff must allege act was wantonly or maliciously done); Berg v. St. Paul City
Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W. 191, 192 (1905) (conductor's assault on street car passenger was not wanton or malicious).
124. See Ward v. National Car Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980) (record
failed to show aggravated circumstances from which malice might be inferred); Hiveley v.
Golnick, 123 Minn. 498, 502, 144 N.W. 213, 215 (1913) (when wrongful act does not imply
malice, plaintiff must allege intent or purpose behind defendant's wrongful act); Anderson
v. International Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 52, 116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908)
("authorities very generally permit recovery [of punitive damages] when the tort is committed with cruelty, oppression, insult, or such gross negligence as to justify the inference
of malice as a matter of law"); Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W. 158, 158 (1902)
(when act does not imply malice, plaintiff should allege facts warranting exemplary damages); Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R.R., 45 Minn. 53, 55, 47 N.W. 312, 313 (1890) ("malice
may often be inferred from the nature of the wrong"). But see Benson Coop. Creamery
Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 529, 151 N.W.2d 422, 428 (1967) ("[a]lmost
universally the decisions hold that mere 'implied malice,' which is attributed to any actionable conduct, does not suffice") (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 79).
125. While the Minnesota Supreme Court has seldom defined the term willful in the
punitive damages context, it is apparent that the court equates "willful" with "intentional." See, e.g., Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 53,
116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908) (" 'willful' and 'unlawful' . . . designate a wrongful act, done
intentionally, without just or reasonable cause"); id at 54, 116 N.W. at 103 (Brown, J.,
dissenting) ("[tihe ordinary significance of [willful] . . .is that of intention").
In the context of criminal assault and battery, the Minnesota court has expressly
defined "willful" to mean "intentional." See State v. Bowers, 178 Minn. 589, 591, 228
N.W. "164, 165 (1929) (willful as meaning wrongful and intentional assault); State v.
Smith, 159 Minn. 511, 516, 199 N.W. 427, 429 (1924) ("[w]ilfully means deliberately; and
intentionally and with design and purpose'); State v. Damuth, 135 Minn. 76, 80, 160
N.W. 196, 198 (1916) (" 'wilfully' means 'designedly' or 'intentionally' ").
126. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly defined the term "wanton" in the context of punitive damages, it is nevertheless evident that "wanton" conduct
may be categorized as intentional conduct. See, e.g., Ward v. National Car Rental Sys.,
290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980) (false arrest was not committed so wantonly or mali-
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unlawful conduct done freely and purposely,128 the court's definition of
malice has been far less consistent.129 The Minnesota Supreme Court
has variously defined malicel30 as a wrong "malevolently done, or in
wanton indifference to the rights invaded,"1 3 , an act done "in the spirit
of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligation,"'' 32 "the intentional doing of a harmful act without legal justification,"' 3 3 and other
3 4
assorted definitions. 1

Despite this instability in definition, however, it is clear that the malice
required for an award of punitive damages is more than the mere doing
of an unlawful and injurious act.' 3 5 Rather, the intent and motive beciously as to show a conscious or reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights) (citing Crea v.
Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284 (1952)); Hiveley v. Gotnick, 123 Minn.
498, 502, 144 N.W. 213, 215 (1913) (plaintiff must allege wanton or malicious intent or
purpose behind defendant's act); Craig v. Cook, 28 Minn. 232, 236, 9 N.W. 712, 714
(1881) ("trespass was wantonly committed ... by one knowing he had no right to do the
acts").
127. See notes 125-26 supra.
128. See State v. Monson, 168 Minn. 381, 383-84, 210 N.W. 108, 109 (1926). In Monson, the trial court stated in its jury instruction: "[i]ntent or intention are difficult to
define. The words practically define themselves. It has been stated however by our courts
that intent means doing an unlawful act intentionally, that is, freely, purposely. I think I
can give you no better definition." See also In re Shotwell, 43 Minn. 389, 393, 45 N.W. 842,
844 (1890); Wilcox v. Davis, 4 Minn. 197, 200, 4 Gil. 139, 142 (1860).
129. See notes 130-34 infa and accompanying text.
130. The malice necessary for an award of punitive damages has been called malice,
actual malice, malice in fact, and legal malice. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds &
Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 95 (Minn. 1979) (malice); Easton Farmers Elevator Co. v.
Chromalloy Am. Corp., 310 Minn. 568, 579, 246 N.W.2d 705, 712 (1976) (per curiam)
(actual malice); Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 529, 151
N.W.2d 422, 428 (1967) (actual malice); Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W. 158,
158 (1902) (malice in fact); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 201-02, 7 Gil. 128, 144 (1862)
(legal malice).
131. Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R.R., 45 Minn. 53, 55, 47 N.W. 312, 313 (1890).
132. Seeman v. Feeney, 19 Minn. 79, 83, 19 Gil. 54, 57 (1872) (quoting Philadelphia,
W., & B.R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 214 (1858)).
133. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 95 (Minn.
1979); Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 410, 196 N.W.2d 478, 480 (1972) (per curiam).
134. See, e.g., Lewis v. Minneapolis Inv. Co., 153 Minn. 183, 185, 190 N.W. 70, 70
(1922) (an unlawful act done knowingly and purposely is by law malicious); Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W. 158, 158 (1902) (malice as wanton negligence). The Minnesota Supreme Court defined malice in Minnesota's first punitive damages case as:
Whatever is done wilfully and purposely, if it be at the same time wrong and
unlawful, and that known to the party, is in legal contemplation malicious.
That which is done contrary to one's own conviction of duty, or with a wilful
disregard of the rights of others, whether it be to compass some unlawful end, or
some lawful end by unlawful means, or, in the language of the charge, to do a
wrong or unlawful act, knowing it to b such, constitutes legal malice.
Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 201-02, 7 Gil. 128, 144 (1862) (quoting Wills v. Noyes, 29
Mass. 324, 328, 12 Pick. 329, 333 (1832)).
135. See Ward v. National Car Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980) (false
arrest without reasonable cause, though unlawful, did not itselfjustify punitive damages);
Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 529, 151 N.W.2d 422,
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hind a defendant's act are of critical importance.136 Consequently, the
Minnesota Supreme Court generally has limited punitive damage
37
awards to cases involving intentional torts.
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court occasionally has added the element of reckless disregard 138 to the original willful, wanton, and malicious standard.1 39 This addition of reckless disregard to the punitive
damages standard may have extended the element of malice to include
aggravated and culpable instances of unintentional injury.140 The Min427-28 (1967) (unlawful termination of membership in association was not enough to establish a right to punitive damages); Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W. 158, 158
(1902) (merely committing a wrongful and unlawful act affecting the person or property
of another does not justify the imposition of exemplary damages); Hoffman v. Northern
Pac. R.R., 45 Minn. 53, 55, 47 N.W. 312, 313 (1890) (the malice that justifies an award of
exemplary damages "is not the mere doing of an unlawful and injurious act"); Seeman v.
Feeney, 19 Minn. 79, 83, 19 Gil. 54, 57 (1872) (merely taking a horse, while not legally
excusable, is not malicious).
136. See Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 528, 151
N.W.2d 422, 427 (1967) ("To justify an award of punitive damages, the wrongful act must
have been done with malicious motive."); Hively v. Golnick, 123 Minn. 498, 501, 144
N.W. 213, 215 (1913) (jury instruction was erroneous for not including the element of
defendant's motives); Seeman v. Feeney, 19 Minn. 79, 83, 19 Gil. 54, 56 (1872) (jury instructions "ignored the defendant's intent and motives, which are always material in the
question of exemplary damages"); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 201, 7 Gil. 128, 144 (1862)
(unlawful attachment of exempt property evinced malicious motive). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has indicated that the wrongdoer's motive need not arise out of spite or ill
will. See Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 196 N.W.2d 478 (1972) (per curiam). In
Johnson, the court stated that "whether a wrongdoer's motive in interfering is to benefit
himself, or to gratify his spite by working mischief to another, is immaterial, malice in the
sense of ill-will or spite not being essential." Id at 410, 196 N.W.2d at 480.
137. See 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 195 G-S, Comment (2d ed. 1974); notes 18,
128 supra.
138. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not defined "reckless disregard" in
the punitive damages context, it has defined recklessness in connection with the reckless
operation of a motor vehicle. In Brandsoy v. Bromeland, 177 Minn. 298, 225 N.W. 162
(1929), the court noted the following meanings of reckless: "[h]eedless, careless, rash, indifferent to consequences; not recking of consequences; desperately heedless, as from folly,
passion, or perversity, impetuosity, or rashly adventurous; rashly or indifferently negligent;
careless, heedless; mindless; rashly negligent; utterly careless or heedless." Id. at 300, 225
N.W. at 163 (citation omitted). The court also cited the StandardDictonary, which defines
reckless as: "1) Destitute of heed or concern for consequences; especially foolishly heedless
of danger; headlong; rash; desperate. 2) Not caring or noting; neglectful; indifferent." Id
In addition the Brandsoy court noted that Webster'r Dtitionar, defines reckless as: "1) Inattention to duty; neglectful; indifferent. Obs. 2) Rashly negligent; utterly careless or heedless." Id at 301, 225 N.W. at 163.
The Brandsoy court recognized that none of these definitions make willful, intentional,
or wanton acts a necessary element of recklessness. Id Consequently, the court concluded
that while recklessness was more than negligence, it did include conduct "evincing an
indifference to or heedless disregard of obvious duty and of probable consequences and
dangers." Id
139. See note 141 infra.
140. See id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held consistently that mere acts of
negligence will not support an award of punitive damages. See Cobb v. Midwest Recovery

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 11
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

nesota court has often limited this apparent extension, however, by using
the term reckless disregard only in conjunction with other pejorative
terms usually associated with intentional misconduct.14 Nevertheless,
this addition of reckless disregard to the original standard has the practical effect of equating reckless conduct with the malice sufficient to justify
142
an award of punitive damages.
Third, the supreme court has used a disjunctive standard under which
reckless disregard or gross negligence may sustain an award of punitive
damages independent of a finding of malice.143 In one case the court
noted that the conditions that give rise to punitive damages are stated in
the alternative; they all need not be present to warrant an award of punitive damages. 144
It is apparent from these three trends that the minimum standard for a
Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Minn. 1980) ("[p]unitive damages are not recoverable
where the wrongful conduct is merely negligent"); Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First
Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 529, 151 N.W.2d 422, 428 (1967) (almost universally, negligence will not suffice for exermplary damages).
141. See Ward v. National Car Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980) (false
arrest not "committed so wantonly or maliciously as to show a conscious or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights"); Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 28485 (1952) (assault and battery committed so wantonly and maliciously as to show conscious or reckless disregard of the rights of plaintiff); Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490,
494, 229 N.W. 869, 871 (1930) (assault and battery "committed recklessly, wantonly, and
maliciously"); Berg v. St. Paul City Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W. 191, 192 (1905)
(assault was not "wanton, or malicious, or fraudulent, or oppressive, and of such a character as to indicate that . . . [the defendant] acted with a reckless disregard of the rights of
the plaintiff").
142. See note 141 supra.
143. See, e.g., E.H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 646, (D. Minn. 1979)
(punitive damages punish offender for his reckless or oppressive conduct); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96, 104 (D. Minn. 1967) (improperly investing trust
funds constituted conduct which was "malicious, wilful or in reckless disregard of the
rights of others"); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Minn.
1980) ("[g]enerally, punitive damages are allowed only for conduct which is done with
malicious, wilfull or reckless disregard for the rights of others"); Huebsch v. Larson, 291
Minn. 361, 364, 191 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1971) (the general rule in Minnesota is to grant
punitive damages for conduct that is malicious, willful, or in reckless disregard of the
rights of others).
In Oakhurst, Inc., v. Tasco, Inc., No. 27015 (Minn. 3d Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 1978) (trial
court memorandum) the trial court, after noting the conjunctive and disjunctive forms of
the Minnesota punitive damages standard, also concluded that "the issue of punitive damages is to be submitted to the jury whenever the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to
find malice or ill will or reckless or conscious disregard for the rights of others." See id, slip
op. at 63-65.
144. See Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of America, 104 Minn. 49, 52-53, 116
N.W. 101, 102 (1908) (assault). In Anderson, the court indicated that punitive damages are
generally recoverable when the tort is committed with "cruelty, oppression, insult, or such
gross negligence as to justify the inference of malice as a matter of law." Id Moreover,
the court noted that these conditions need not concur for punitive damages to be awarded.
See id
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punitive damage award under Minnesota common law is that of reckless
disregard. Neither a showing of willful or wanton conduct nor a showing
of malice remain essential to an award of punitive damages. Consequently, the supreme court appears to have extended the availability of
punitive damage awards to instances of reckless or unintentional conduct.' 4 5 Whether the supreme court intended to extend punitive damages to such conduct, or whether the apparent extension is merely the
result of imprecise language, is not clear. Unfortunately, the court has
frequently adjusted the common-law standard in an apparent attempt to
apply it to a given fact situation with little or no explanation or analysis.
VI.

THE STATUTORY PUNITIVE DAMAGES STANDARD:

A

SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION

In an attempt to clarify the common-law standard, the Minnesota
Legislature recently enacted Minnesota Statutes section 549.20.146 Although the bill that gave rise to this statute originally was designed solely
to govern punitive damages in products liability actions, 14 7 through the
legislative hearings it was transformed into a bill covering punitive damages in all civil actions.148 The statute now provides in part that "punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and
convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indif49
ference to the rights or safety of others."1
145. For the distinction drawn between intentional conduct and reckless conduct, see
note 158 infa.
146. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 4, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 838 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 549.20 (1980)). This statute is reprinted in part at note 149 infia.
147. See Tape of Meeting on H.F 338 Before the Minnesota Senate Judaiciay Subcommittee on
JudacialAdministration, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess. (May 3, 1977).
For a case discussing the burden the award of punitive damages places upon manufacturers, see notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
148. See Tape of Debate on H.F 338 Before the Mmnesota Senate, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978
Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978); Tape ofMeeting on H.F 338 Before the Minnesota SenateJudiciagy Committee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 22, 1978); id (Feb. 6, 1978); Tape of Meeting on HF
338 Before the Minnesota Senate Judiiary Subcommittee on JudicialAdministration, 70th Minn.
Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1978).
149. MINN. STAT. § 549.20(1) (1980). The remainder of Minnesota's punitive damages statute provides that:
Subd. 2. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or principal because of an act done by an agent only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him,
or

(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.
Subd. 3. Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors
which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the seriousness or the hazard to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct, the
profitability of the misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the misconduct
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The clarity that this statutory punitive damages standard provides to
the common-law punitive damages standard will depend largely upon
.the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of "willful indifference."
Although the court has not yet interpreted this element of the statute, it
is apparent that the legal standard of willful indifference should be
viewed as a standard requiring intentional conduct 50 rather than the
reckless conduct that apparently sufficed under Minnesota's commonlaw standard.' 5 1 As an intent standard, the threshold of willful indifference clearly would be exceeded if a manufacturer actually intended to
injure consumers by marketing a defective product. 152 In addition, however, to ensure that consumers are adequately protected from a manufacturer's misconduct, the willful indifference standard should also be
satisfied by conduct demonstrating such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights and safety of others as to be tantamount to an intent to
injure. 153 The willful indifference standard thus could be extended to
cover those products liability cases in which manufacturers fail to take
even the most basic steps to discover product hazards, refuse to adopt
feasible and inexpensive corrective measures, or deliberately conceal suband any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard
and of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct, the number and level of employees involved in causing or
concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of the defendant, and the
total effect of the other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damage awards
to the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be subject.
Id § 549.20(2)-(3).
150. See notes 152-54 tfra and accompanying text. For a definition of intent, see note
128 supra.
151. See notes 121-44 supra and accompanying text. For the Minnesota Supreme
Court's definition of reckless, see note 138 supra.
152. See note 153 nfra.
153. Punitive damages generally are awarded only for intentional torts. See Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); note 68 supra. The remedy
of punitive damages, however, has been extended to cases in which the defendant does not
intend to injure the plaintiff. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 838.
Consequently, punitive damages are often awarded when the defendant shows "such a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called
willful or wanton." Id (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 10). The Rog'nky court, in
conceding that this extension of punitive damages was a natural result, stated:
[Flrom a moral standpoint there is not too much difference between the driver
who heads his car into a plaintiff and the driver who takes the wheel knowing
himself to be so drunk that he probably will hit someone and not caring whether
he does or not; and it is as important to deter the latter type of conduct as the
former.
Id, accord, Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (punitive
damages denied because defendant's conduct didn't "approximat[e] a fixed purpose to
bring about the injury of which plaintiff complains"), aj'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980);
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (punitive damages
are awardable if defendant's conduct "showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others").
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stantial dangers simply to enhance the marketability and profitability of
their products. 154
Although it has been suggested that the difference between the standards of willful conduct and of reckless conduct is practically indiscernable, 155 it is apparent that the two terms create a different standard of
care. In G.D.Sear/e &Co. v. Superior Court,156 a case in which a California
Court of Appeal rejected a standard of reckless disregard in favor of a
standard of conscious disregard, 5 7 the court stated:
[Olne is struck by the synonymity sometimes ascribed to nonsynonymous terms. Typical is Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, supra.
There the court declares that malice may be established by evidence of
conduct which is "willful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of
its possible results." . .. According to dictionary definitions, willfulness and intent denote deliberation or design; recklessness, in contrast,
connotes action which is insensate, heedless, or negligent. To apply
these adjectives conjunctively to a single course of conduct is self contradictory. "If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is
not negligent."' 5 8
Thus, even though the distinction between a broadly interpreted intent standard and a standard of recklessness may be fine, it is nevertheless clear that willful indifference should be interpreted purely in terms of
an intent standard rather than as a standard of recklessness. Only by
interpreting and defining the punitive damages standard in this refined
fashion will the court avoid the same imprecision and confusion that occurred by blending notions of reckless conduct and intentional conduct
154. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 132-33; Owen, supra note 2, at 1362-63.
155. See Owen, supra note 2, at 1363 n.502. After noting that punitive damages may
be recovered in most jurisdictions upon a showing of either conscious or reckless misconduct, Professor Owen concludes that the difference between notions of "conscious" or
"reckless" or "wilful" and "wanton" disregard for the interests of others is practicably
indiscernible in many contexts. Id. This, it is contended, is particularly true in products
liability actions. See id.See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment b,
at 465 (1979) ("Reckless indifference to the rights of others and conscious action in deliberate disregard of them . . .may provide the necessary state of mind to justify punitive
damages.").
156. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
157. See id at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
158. Id at 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (citation omitted). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 500, Comment f (1965). The Restatement draws a specific distinction between
intentional misconduct and reckless misconduct, stating:
Reckless misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important
particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor
does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he
realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong
probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his
conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong probability is a different thing
from the substantial certainty without which he cannot be said to intend the
harm in which his act results.
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within Minnesota's common-law punitive damages standard.159
Several factors support the conclusion that willful indifference should
be interpreted as an intent standard rather than as a lesser standard of
recklessness. First, the legislation that evolved into Minnesota Statutes
section 549.20 originally was designed to benefit Minnesota businesses for
whom products liability insurance had become either too expensive or
totally unavailable.160 The basic purpose of the initial legislation was to
protect Minnesota businesses from the growing threat of devastating punitive damage awards by providing a consistent standard for punitive
damage awards in the business context. 16t It is apparent, therefore, that
the legislature intended to prevent any broadening of the common-law
punitive damages standard.
Second, the examples of willful indifference cited in the legislative history were of such an extreme nature that punitive damage awards
against the manufacturer were clearly warranted. 162 Moreover, the hypotheticals and terminology used by the drafters to define willful indifference were limited to intentional conduct.163
159. See notes 121-44 supra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the
various punitive damages standards that different states have applied in awarding punitive damages in products liability actions and an analysis of how a lack of consistency in
the standards applied has given rise to an "imprecise state of the law," see Fulton, supra
note 10, at 128-32.
160. See Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294
N.W.2d 297, 310-11 (Minn. 1980) (statute was enacted "in response to concerns which a
variety of constitutents expressed to the legislature about the awarding of punitive damages in products liability cases"); Heins, supra note 94, at 6; Tape of Meeting on HF 338
Before the Minnesota Senatejudciaty Subcommittee onjudiaalAdmiistration, 70th Minn. Legis.,
1977 Sess. (May 3, 1977).
161. See Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294
N.W.2d 297, 310-11 (Minn. 1980) ("the concern of the legislature was to limit the frequency and amounts of punitive damages awards"); Tape of Debate on H.F 338 Before the
Mhnnesota Senate, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978); Tape of Meeting on HF 338
Before the Minnesota Senateffudiciar, Committee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 6, 1978);
Tape of Meeting on -IF 338 Before the Minnesota Senate Subcommittee on JudicialAdministration,
70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1978); Tape of Meeting on H F 338 Before the Mnnesota
Senatejudiciay Subcommittee onjudiciaAdministration,70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess. (May 3,
1977).
162. See Tape of Meeting on HF 338 Before the Minnesota SenateJudiciahr Committee, 70th
Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 22, 1978). The examples of willful indifference given by
Senator Davies (senate author) included references to the "Pinto case," an apparent reference to Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1977-61 (Cal. Orange County Super. Ct. Feb. 6,
1978), appealdocketed, No. 4 Civil 20095 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1978) (ruptured
gas tank causing automobile to explode upon impact; $125,000,000 punitive damage
award; reduced to $3,500,000 by trial judge on April 2, 1978 because award was excessive
as a matter of law), and the Richardson-Merrell MER/29 cases; see notes 49-66 supra and
accompanying text.
163. When Senator McCutcheon asked Senator Davies (senate author) what willful
indifference meant, Senator Davies, referring to the MER/29 cases, stated that it would be
willful indifference if a manufacturer failed to withdraw the product or pursue its inquiries after "the company had some consciousness of its ability to do horrendous evil." See
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Third, the drafters of the statute increased the burden of proof from a
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence.1 6 4 This
stricter standard of proof indicates that the drafters intended to make
recovery of punitive damages more difficult under the statute than it had
been under the common law.165
Fourth, the drafters chose to use the standard of willful indifference
rather than the standard of reckless disregard that often has been cited as
a sufficient standard for punitive damages under Minnesota common
law. 16 6 Furthermore, Minnesota punitive damages case law indicates
Tape of Meeting on HF 338 Before the Minnesota SenateJudiciagCommittee, 70th Minn. Legis.,
1978 Sess. (Feb. 22, 1978). Senator Dieterich, in response to the same question, indicated
that willful indifference is "intentionally disregarding a right or risk which you are aware
of, which is known to you." Id. Similarly, Charles Hvass, Jr., speaking on behalf of the
Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association, stated that in seeking to recover punitive damages
"you're almost proving an intentional action by the manufacturer." Id
164. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20(1) (1980). In his discussion of the statute prior to its
enactment Senator Davies (senate author) noted that a burden of proof requiring clear
and convincing evidence was appropriate in cases awarding punitive damages because
such cases were almost quasi-criminal in nature. See Tape of Meeting on H F 338 Before the
Minnesota SenateJudiiag Committee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 22, 1978).
Under the proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act, a burden of proof requiring clear and convincing evidence was also adopted. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 120(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,748
(1979). By adopting a standard of proof somewhere between the civil tests of a preponderance of the evidence and the criminal test of beyond a reasonable doubt, the drafters
hoped to assuage the argument that punitive damages apply a criminal law sanction to a
civil law case without providing the defendant with the constitutional safeguards normally
available under the criminal law. See id Analysis, reprted n 44 Fed. Reg. 62,748-49
(1979). See also note 10 supra.
165. Prior to the enactment of MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1980), a plaintiff could recover
punitive damages through proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Wick v.
Widdell, 276 Minn. 51, 53-54, 149 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1967) (in civil action, damages may be
proven by preponderance of evidence); Carpenter v. Nelson, 257 Minn. 424, 427-28, 101
N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960) (damages in civil actions only require fair preponderance of evidence); Thoreson v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 29 Minn. 107, 107-08, 12 N.W. 154, 154
(1882) (issues in civil actions need only be determined by fair preponderance of evidence).
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not defined clear and convincing evidence in a punitive damages context, Justice Peterson, in Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d
892, 895 (Minn. 1978) (paternity suit), defined clear and convincing proof, stating:
"Clear and convincing proof" means exactly what is suggested by the ordinary
meanings of the terms making up the phrase. Satisfaction of this standard requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Clear and convincing proof will be shown where the truth of
the facts asserted is "highly probable."
Id; accord, Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 703, 709 (1976) (clear and
convincing defined as "highly probable" in products liability context).
166. See notes 138-44 supra and accompanying text. It should also be noted that the
drafters of section 120 of the proposed Uniform Product Liability Act, who drew upon
MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1980) in drafting the Act, chose to use a standard of reckless disregard rather than the willful indifference standard contained in the Minnesota statute. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 120, Analysis,
reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,748-49 (1979). Accordingly, section 120(A) of the Act provides
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that willful connotes intentional rather than reckless conduct. 16 7 Thus,
1 8
because the drafters selected the standard of willful indifference 6 to
6
limit the circumstances in which punitive damages are justified,1 9 and
because punitive damages were limited to intentional misconduct under
Minnesota's common-law standard,170 willful indifference should be interpreted to be an intent standard rather than as a standard of recklessness.
Additional support for the use of an intent standard exists. Because
actions that constitute reckless conduct may be interpreted broadly, 17 1 a
jury may too easily confuse a standard based on reckless conduct with
negligence or truly inadvertent conduct. 17 2 Concern over the possibility
of confusion has caused at least one jurisdiction to reject the reckless disregard standard.173 Furthermore, the danger of confusion, coupled with
the strong likelihood of multiple punitive damage awards in products
that "(p]unitive damages may be awarded to the claimant if the claimant proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers, or others who might be harmed
by the product." Id. § 120(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,748 (1979).
For a general analysis of section 120 of the proposed Uniform Product Liability Act,
see Fulton, supra note 10, at 123-32.
167. Se notes 125-27 supra and accompanying text.
168. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not defined "indifference" in any of its case
law. Professor Owen, however, who recommends the imposition of punitive damages for
conduct "reflecting a flagrant indifference to the public safety," see Owen, supra note 2, at
1368, states that the word indifference is essentially synonymous with the word disregard.
See id at 1368 n.525. Owen also indicates that:
"Indifference" to the public safety conveys the idea that the manufacturer simply does not care whether or to what extent the public safety may be endangered
by its product despite the availability of feasible means to reduce the danger
substantially. It implies a basic disrespect and consequent disregard for the interests of others.
Id at 1368 (footnote omitted).
169. See notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 18 supra.
171. See note 138 supra.
172. See Fulton, supra note 10, at 125; Owen,supra note 2, at 1366; cf. W. PROSSER,
supra note 2,§ 2,at 10 ("mere negligence isnot enough" for punitive damages); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment b, at 765 (1979) ("[p]unitive damages are not

awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors ofjudgment and the like, which constitute
ordinary negligence").
173. See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text. In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975), the California court expressed concern over the "accretion of judicial definitions of malice" which for purposes of punitive
damages had "pushed to the fore a number of imprecise verbal signals which-by color,
nuance and suggestion-invite the jury to punish the defendant for violating the jurors'
standards rather than the law's." Id at 31-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Among the imprecise renditions of malice was reckless disregard. See id.This standard was found to violate
California's exemplary damages statute which required a showing of evil motive. See id.
Accordingly, the court concluded that "consacous d"regardofsafety" was the proper standard
for exemplary damage awards in the cases of nondeliberte injury. See id. at 32, 122 Cal.
Rptr. at 225 (emphasis in original).
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liability actions, could prove economically fatal to Minnesota businesses
and manufacturers that are subjected to such awards. 174 If businesses
and manufacturers are to survive the growing number and size of punitive damage awards, they should be both apprised of, and permitted to
rely on, a punitive damages standard that requires either an intent to
injure or conduct that will be deemed the equivalent thereof before being
subjected to potentially ruinous punitive damage awards. 175 Similarly,
consumers are entitled to know and rely upon a standard that will fairly
and adequately protect their rights.
To ensure the development of a predictable punitive damages standard, the standard must be made as precise as possible.176 To aid courts
in establishing reasonable precision, the drafters of the Minnesota Statute set forth a standard for determining whether punitive damages are
appropriate and eight specific factors to be considered by juries in measuring an award of punitive damages. 177 These factors, which were derived from misconduct found in past products liability lawsuits,178 were
designed to promote fairness in future products liability cases. 179 Factors
to be considered are the seriousness of the hazard to the public, the profitability of a defendant's misconduct, the duration of the misconduct,
any concealment of the misconduct, a defendant's awareness of the hazard and its excessiveness, a defendant's attitude and conduct upon the
discovery of the misconduct, and the number and level of employees
causing or concealing the misconduct.180 Conversely, to prevent Minnesota businesses from suffering undue financial hardship, an award of punitive damages takes into account a defendant's financial condition and
the total effect of punishment against a defendant through other civil or
criminal sanctions.181

Only by considering these factors can the danger of multiple punitive
174. See generaly notes 78-94 supra and accompanying text.
175. See generaly Owen, supra note 2, at 1325-27 (discussing need for broadly defined
punitive damages standard that has sufficient specificity to give manufacturers adequate
notice of type of conduct that will subject them to punitive damages).
176. See id.
177. MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (1980). See aLro U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE MODEL
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 120(B), reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,748 (1979) (formulating eight factors similar to MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (1980)).
178. Senator Davies (senate author) indicated that the factors for measuring punitive
damages were based upon the facts arising in past products liability cases such as Sturm,
Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) and Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See Tape of Debate on H.. 338 Before the Mmizesota SenateJudiciaa7y Committee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 22, 1978).
179. Senator Davies (senate author) also stated that he felt the factors in MINN. STAT.
§ 549.20(3) (1980) created a good balance with some factors weighing in favor of punitive
damages and some against punitive damages. See Tape of Debate on H. 338 Before the
Minnesota SenateJudiay Committee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 22, 1978).
180. MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (1980). See note 149 supra.
181. See id
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damage awards resulting in bankruptcy or excessive punishment be reduced or eliminated.' 8 2 Further, these same factors should aid courts
and juries in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate in a
particular case.' 8 3 Thus, these statutory factors should be considered
both as a means of determining the amount of a punitive damage award
and as guidelines to determine whether a business or manufacturer acted
with sufficient intent to warrant a finding of such willful indifference to
8
justify an award of punitive damages. 4
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although the Minnesota Supreme Court willingly awarded punitive
damages in Ggc, the court did so with little analysis of several highly
debated issues involved in awarding punitive damages in products liability actions. This was not necessarily an unreasonable approach because
6-yc was an extreme case clearly warranting an award of punitive damages. Not only did the defendant in Ggyc know that its cotton flannelette
was highly flammable, it failed to use readily available flame retardants
or feasible warnings that would have significantly reduced the garment's
danger to consumers. Moreover, motivated purely by its own financial
well-being, the defendant knowingly failed to use these safeguards and
failed to withdraw the product from the market once it learned of the
danger. Such extreme conduct, however, may not be present in future
products liability lawsuits in which punitive damages are sought. Consequently, such issues as the injustice of multiple damage awards, the incompatibility of punitive damages with products liability actions, how
properly to limit punitive damage awards, and the ability of manufacturers to insure against punitive damage awards are bound to arise in
future cases.
One issue that will inevitably arise is the proper standard for punitive
damages in products liability actions. The standard that the Minnesota
Supreme Court eventually employs will bear heavily upon many of the
issues addressed and left unaddressed by the Gyc court. For example,
the danger imposed by multiple punitive damage awards will be directly
affected by the standard that the court ultimately develops. If the standard is too lenient, or too easily confused with inadvertent conduct,
many businesses and manufacturers may be seriously threatened with
financial ruin. Yet the court must also guard against establishing a standard that would permit businesses and manufacturers to continue unchecked in their quest for higher profits at the expense of the rights and
safety of consumers. Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court should
182. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979) (recognizing that
application of Professor Owen's eight similar factors, mentioned in note 31 supra, can partially dispel spectres of bankruptcy and excessive punishment).
183. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
184. See id
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view the statutory standard of willful indifference as requiring, through
clear and convincing evidence, a showing of a conscious or deliberate
disregard of the rights and safety of others and not merely a showing of
reckless conduct. By interpreting willful indifference in this fashion the
standard should provide a sufficient threshold in the minds of jurors to
prevent inappropriate punitive damage awards against manufacturers.
At the same time, however, this interpretation of the standard is lenient
enough to encompass those manufacturers who fail to take basic steps to
discover product hazards, correct defects or remove unreasonably dangerous products from the marketplace. Furthermore, by developing and
strictly adhering to a precise standard of conduct the Minnesota
Supreme Court can eliminate the inconsistency and confusion surrounding the common-law punitive damages standard. Moreover, the court
can ensure a uniform standard, as contemplated by Minnesota's punitive
damages statute, that will consider and minimize the dangers and conflicts involved in awarding punitive damages in various civil actions. If
the court interprets the statute accordingly, there should be little reason
why punitive damages cannot serve as an effective and just form of punishment and deterrence in all civil actions.
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